




# **MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT**

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**30th Jan – 05th Feb**

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## OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



| CATEGORY               | No.      | Page Ref. |
|------------------------|----------|-----------|
| Armed Robbery          | Nil      | NSTR      |
| Attack                 | Nil      | NSTR      |
| Attempted Boarding     | Nil      | NSTR      |
| Boarding               | Nil      | NSTR      |
| Hijack                 | Nil      | NSTR      |
| Kidnap                 | Nil      | NSTR      |
| Piracy                 | Nil      | NSTR      |
| Suspicious Activity    | Nil      | NSTR      |
| Other Maritime Crimes  | Nil      | NSTR      |
| <b>Total Incidents</b> | <b>0</b> |           |



# MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)

VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE



## WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

## WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

## HOW TO REPORT

- Online: [www.mscio.eu](http://www.mscio.eu)
- Email: [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)
- Copy UKMTO: [watchkeepers@ukmto.com](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.com)

## BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -
- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -
- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

**Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea**



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**RELEASABLE TO SHIPPING INDUSTRY**  
FROM 30<sup>TH</sup> JAN TO 05<sup>TH</sup> FEB 2026

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## MSCIO WEBSITE. USEFUL LINKS

To know more about different maritime security threats, please access to the following links:

[MSC IO | Useful Links](#)

### 1. General Maritime Security:

[MSC IO | General Maritime Security](#)

### 2. Maritime Terrorism:

[MSC IO | Maritime Terrorism](#)

### 3. Piracy Information:

[MSC IO | Piracy Information](#)

### 4. Illegal Traffic and Fishing


[MSC IO | Illegal Traffic & Fishing](#)

### 5. Maritime Cybersecurity Information.

[MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information](#)

### 6. Submarine Critical Infrastructure.

[MSC IO | Submarine Critical Infrastructure](#)



## MARITIME SECURITY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)


| No | Date   | Name                | MSE Category  | Last info.  |
|----|--------|---------------------|---------------|---|
| 53 | 31 DEC | FV LIAO DONG YU 578 | Armed Robbery | Hijack reported off the coast of Banderbeyla (Bari Region). <b>The vessel is still anchored near Banderbeyla.</b>   |
| 54 | 02 JAN | FV SULTANA 2        | Hijack        | Received a Piracy incident report from PMPF on IORIS platform. The dhow with its 14 crew is currently located off Al- Nushayah, West of Bir Ali area. All passengers have been disembarked. <b>On 13 JAN 26, the Yemen Coast Guard confirmed that the issue has been resolved following an agreement with the vessel's owner. The dhow was released together with its crew.</b> |

● Solved or closed cases
 ● Active cases
 ● Unsolved cases




# PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – FEB 2026)

54 Events



## PIRACY RELATED EVENTS



### Pirated (Outside TTW) / Armed Robbery at sea (Inside TTW)

- PAG takes control of the ship and requests a ransom

### Piracy Attack

- PAG unsuccessful attack on ship

### Hijack

- Attackers boarded and taken control of a ship against the crew's will

### Boarding

- Successful attack but pirates do not take control

### Suspicious Approach

- Suspicious maneuvering with clear intentions to attack. (weapons clearly displayed)



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
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# PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – FEB 2026)



## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

On October 2025 a PAG was formed that used the original PAG's tactics. As the PAG was not apprehended by the authorities until now, it should be considered inland in Garacaad area but active. It is possible that the PAG that hijacked the Chinese FV on Dec 31 could be the same one.




# ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the **GULF OF ADEN**.

**Coast of Bari (NE of Somalia) and East coast from Bari to Galgadud** region remain **MODERATE**.



| THREAT ASSESSMENT | BENIGN  | LOW                                      | MODERATE   | SUBSTANTIAL  | SEVERE  | CRITICAL                                    |
|-------------------|---|--|--|--|---|---|
| YARDSTICK         | An attack is<br>HIGHLY<br>UNLIKELY<br>(10% – 20%) | An attack is<br>UNLIKELY<br>(>25% – 35%) | An attack is a<br>REALISTIC<br>POSSIBILITY<br>(40% – <50%) | An attack is<br>LIKELY /<br>PROBABLE<br>(55% – <75%) | An attack is<br>HIGHLY<br>LIKELY<br>(80% – 90%) | An attack is<br>ALMOST<br>CERTAIN<br>(>95%) |





## REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

### Registration and reporting.

CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>)
- UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>)

And report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

### Contact Information (MSCIO):

**Tel:** 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 (0) 298 220 170

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**Email:** [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)

