





MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

24th Apr – 30rd Apr

 postmaster@mscio.eu


 0033 (0) 298 220 220

 <https://mscio.eu/>

 0033 (0) 298 220 170




OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



CATEGORY		No.
	Armed Robbery	Nil
	Attack	Nil
	Attempted Boarding	Nil
	Boarding	Nil
	Hijack	Nil
	Kidnap	Nil
	Piracy	2
	Suspicious Activity	1
	Other Maritime Crimes	Nil
Total Incidents		3

- **TYPE OF INCIDENT:** PIRACY.
- **PERIOD:** FM 21ST APR 1022 UTC – ON GOING
- **LOCATION:** Horn of Africa, Somalia.
- **RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT:**


On 21 April 2026, the tanker M/T HONOUR 25 was hijacked off the Somali coast and remains under pirate control. On 25 April, a dhow was seized approximately 10 nautical miles off Dhinowda, followed by the hijacking of the merchant vessel M/V SWARD on 26 April at position 07°13'N, 049°32'E. These incidents are assessed as potentially linked and remain ongoing, with vessels still under the control of armed individuals. Operation Atalanta continues to monitor and track the situation closely, maintaining coordination with regional partners and ensuring persistent situational awareness. Vessels operating in the area are strongly advised to maintain a heightened level of vigilance, adhere to BMP-MS guidance, particularly within 150NM of the Somali coast between Mogadishu and Hafun, and report any suspicious activity to MSCIO and UKMTO.



SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY


- **TYPE OF INCIDENT:** SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
- **PERIOD:** 28TH APR 16:00 UTC
- **LOCATION:** Horn of Africa, Somalia.
- **RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT:**

MSCIO received a report of an incident involving a merchant vessel at 16:00 UTC on 28 April 2026 in position 03°15'N 056°24'E. A suspicious mothership crossed the vessel from starboard to port at a CPA of approximately 1.2 NM. A skiff was then sighted ahead and later approached from the starboard bow to a distance of approximately 400 m. The vessel increased speed, conducted evasive manoeuvres, and security personnel displayed weapons. The skiff showed intent to board but subsequently disengaged and moved astern, assessed to have returned to the mothership. All crew were safe and accounted for. Operation Atalanta investigated the incident. Vessels operating in the area were strongly advised to maintain heightened vigilance, adhere to BMP-MS, and report any suspicious activity to MSCIO and UKMTO.





OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE AS/SoH/GoO





ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR AS/SoH/GoO



- Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz north of the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) continues to be limited, with most vessels choosing to transit through Omani territorial waters. No confirmed attacks on commercial shipping have been reported in the past 48 hours.
- Anchorage congestion shows no notable variation. Reports of mines in or near the TSS persist, and GNSS interference continues on a sporadic basis, though less intense than in March.
- Across the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea, merchant vessels report a continued naval presence and firm VHF hailing near the Strait of Hormuz. Blockade-related activity remains evident, and ships are advised to maintain safe distance from naval forces.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
 - ✓ Avoid transiting the Strait of Hormuz until safe and coordinated framework for transit has been established by the relevant authorities.
 - ✓ Adhere to guidance issued by their Flag State or competent national authorities when considering transit.
 - ✓ Perform enhanced risk assessment.
 - ✓ Strictly adhere to BMP-MS.
 - ✓ Monitor Ch16 VHF and be prepared to be hailed.
 - ✓ Use AIS as per company policy.
 - ✓ Whenever possible, increase distance from any naval forces to mitigate risk.
 - ✓ Enhance radar and landmark procedures to support safe navigation, since GNSS are likely to be unreliable.
 - ✓ Be prepared to rely on dead-reckoning navigation.



ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR RED SEA/BeM

- Despite the current ceasefire agreement, the potential for the resumption of hostile activity by Iranian-aligned Houthi forces against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent approaches remains active.
- Currently, no Houthi attacks have been reported in the maritime domain.
- Merchant vessels should expect:
 - Higher exposure for vessels with certain affiliations.
 - Potential delays for vessels requesting close protection.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
 - Maintain navigation through international waters for as long as possible.
 - Navigate closer to the African coastline where feasible.
 - Maintain coordination with maritime security reporting centers, both MSCIO and UKMTO.
 - Conduct a voyage-specific risk assessment and adhere to BMP-MS.
 - Before transiting the area, take into consideration any direct or indirect affiliations between the vessel, its ownership, or its cargo and countries of interest.
- Reports indicate GNSS/GPS disruption in the central Red Sea. Vessels may experience degradation or loss of satellite navigation signals. Masters are advised to exercise caution and verify position using alternative navigation methods.



MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)



No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
54	31 DEC	FV LIAO DONG YU 578	Armed Robbery	Armed robbery reported off the coast of Banderbeyla (Bari Region). PSP has informed that the Vessel has been released near Ceel Dhidar, Bandarbeyla district. According to local credible sources, 2 pirates were apprehended and a ransom of 1.2 USD was paid.
55	02 JAN	FV SULTANA 2	Hijack	Alert on IORIS from PMPF. Dhow located off Al- Nushayah. All passengers disembarked. 13JAN Yemen Coast Guard confirmed. RESOLVED after agreement with the vessel's owner. Dhow and crew RELEASED
56	03 FEB	FV AL-WALEED	Armed Robbery	Received a report from Yemen CG on 03 Feb, that a group of 4 armed men captured a Yemeni 8 meter boat (blue hull) on the coast of Hafun. One fisherman was on board during the capture but was later released. The boat is allegedly taken to Dudura coast. Boat size and engine are not coherent with piracy TTP. Event still pending further investigation.
57	26 FEB	UNKNOWN	Piracy Attack	PMPF has reported that two skiffs attempted attacking an Iranian flagged vessel. The vessels defensive actions prevented the boarding. One attacker reportedly killed and two injured. Initial information from LNO MOG and Puntland police, the PAG composition is 9 pirates. PMPF has also allegedly arrested 3 pirates and taken in custody 1 of the 2 skiffs.
58	24 MAR	AL WASEEMI 786	Pirated	Received a report that Iranian dhow "AL WASEEMI 786" with 19 crew members was pirated on the 19 of March aprox 400nm from Mogadishu. The PAG group consisting of a number between 10 and 15pirates. No injuries reported. On 5 th APR 26 the pirates disembarked the dhow and went inland to an UNKNOWN location. EUNAVOFOR ATALANTA conducted FA to ensure the crew safety and gather further information.

- Solved or closed cases.
- Active cases



MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)





No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
59	19 APR	FV ALKHAYR 2	Hijacked	PMPF informed via IORIS on 21 April that FV "ALKHAYR 2" was hijacked IVO Xaafuun on 19 th April by 11 armed individuals (PAG). The FV was released on 21 Apr by the PAG.
60	21 APR (TBD)	MT HONOUR 25	Pirated	PMPF informed via IORIS on 21 April that FV "ALKHAYR 2" was hijacked IVO Xaafuun on 19 th April by 11 armed individuals (PAG). On 21 Apr OHQ was informed that MT HONOUR 25 was pirated by the PAG and now is anchored near GARMAAL, Puntland.
61	22 APR	MV ELFRIEDE	Piracy attack	A small white fishing boat rapidly approach the MV. At approximately 600 metres warning shots were fired and the persons on-board the approaching boat returned fire. The craft then broke off, joined another FV and moved away both of them. The master of MV reports all crew is safe.
62	25 APR	CV FAHAD 4	Armed Robbery at Sea	EUNAVFOR ATALANTA received info from PMPF stating that it was hijacked by a PAG of 11 individuals IVO DHINOWDA (10NM off coast). ALMOST CERTAIN it has been involved in the suspicious approach towards the MT MINERVA PISCES on 28 th APR.
63	26 APR	MV SWARD	Piracy Attack	EUNAVFOR ATALANTA received a report from PMPF that MV SWARD was hijacked near GARACAD offshore area, outside TTW. Vessel owner informed PMPF.
64	28 APR	MV MINERVA PISCES	Suspicious Approach	A suspicious Dhow crossed the MV from starboard to port at a CPA approx 1.2NM. A skiff was then sighted ahead and later approached from the starboard bow o a distance of approx 400m. All crew are safe and accounted for. MV continued sailing towards the next port of call.

● Solved or closed cases.
● Active cases



PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – APR 2026)

PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM NOV 2023 (64)



- SUSPICIOUS APPROACH**

 - Sudden changes of course towards the ship and aggressive behavior. CPA inside 1nm with clear intention to attack and/or weapons clearly displayed.
- ATTEMPTED BOARDING**

 - An Act where the PAG failed to get onboard and gain control of the vessel or members of the crew. Boarding paraphernalia were employed or visible in the approach.
- BOARDING**


 - A boarding in which the attackers have boarded the ship but have NOT taken control.
- PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMED ROBBERY ATTEMPT**

 - Ship has been subject to an aggressive approach by unidentified craft and weapons have been discharged. Also, paraphernalia/ tripwires related to piracy, hooks, ladders ect have been reported.
- HIJACK**

 - Attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a vessel at the high seas against the crew's will.
- PIRATED**

 - A pirated vessel is a vessel subject to an act that falls under the UNCLOS Article 101 definition of piracy.
- ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA**

 - Any illegal act of violence or detention within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.



PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.


It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the ransom paid for the LIAO DONG YU will set a bad example for other pirate groups trying to imitate that operation.

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as:

- **SEVERE** off the Coast GALMUDUG and SOUTH PUNTLAND.
- **MODERATE** in NORTH EASTERN PUNTLAND, HIRSHABELLE, BANADIR, SOUTHWEST and JUBALAND areas.
- **LOW** in the remaining areas.

THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – <50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – <75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (>95%)





REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

REGISTRATION AND REPORTING.

CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>)
- UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>)

And to report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information (MSCIO):

Tel: 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 (0) 298 220 170

Website: www.mscio.eu

Email: postmaster@mscio.eu

MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)

VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE



WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

HOW TO REPORT

- Online: www.mscio.eu
- Email: postmaster@mscio.eu
- Copy UKMTO: watchkeepers@ukmto.com

BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -
- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -
- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea