# MSCIO ATALANTA
# WEEKLY REPORT

## 20th Mar – 26th Mar

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🖥 https://mscio.eu/ ☎ 0033 (0) 298 220 170

| CATEGORY | | No. | Page Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📍 | Armed Robbery | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 | Attack | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 | Attempted Boarding | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 | Boarding | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 | Hijack | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 | Kidnap | Nil | NSTR |
| 📍 | Piracy | 1 | Slide 6 |
| 📍 | Suspicious Activity | 1 | Slide 3 |
| 📍 | Other Maritime Crimes | Nil | NSTR |
| Total Incidents | | 2 | |

## EVENTS FROM 20-26MAR

| NUMBER | DATE | LOCATION | DESCRIPTION |
|--------|------|----------|-------------|
| 24 | 21-Mar | 25-32N 055-15E | A bulk carrier has reported an explosion from an unknown projectile in close proximity of the vessel while at anchor approximately 15NM north of Sharjah, UAE. The crew is reportedly safe. |

**More detailed information can be found in:**
**MSCIO EU | Advisories**

- Military operations keep ongoing in the region and the maritime security environment in the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent waters remains significantly deteriorated.

- No ships has been reportedly attacked during the reporting period. However, it is still possible that vessels in the area may be affected by <u>falling debris</u> from missile or drone interceptions. Masters are advised to follow <u>the post-incident procedures</u> outlined in <u>BMP-MS</u>.

- Due to current high threat level, **<u>TRANSIT THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ STILL REMAINS NOT RECOMMENDED.</u>**

- GNSS/AIS spoofing levels inside the Arabian Gulf, SoH and Gulf of Oman have decreased, however, intermittent disruptions are still reported.

- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
  - ✓ Avoid transiting the Strait of Hormuz until the security situation improves.
  - ✓ Adhere to guidance issued by their Flag State or competent national authorities when considering transit.
  - ✓ Perform enhanced risk assessment.
  - ✓ Strictly adhere to BMP-MS.
  - ✓ Monitor Ch16 VHF and be prepared to be hailed.
  - ✓ Use AIS as per company policy.
  - ✓ Whenever possible, increase distance from any naval forces to mitigate risk.
  - ✓ Enhance radar and landmark procedures to support safe navigation, since GNSS are likely to be unreliable.
  - ✓ Be prepared to rely on dead-reckoning navigation.

- The potential for the resumption of hostile activity by Iranian-aligned Houthi forces against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent approaches remains active but it is not considered probable.

- Currently, no Houthi attacks have been reported in the maritime domain.

- Merchant vessels should expect:
  - Higher exposure for vessels with certain affiliations.
  - Potential delays for vessels requesting close protection.

- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
  - Maintain navigation through international waters for as long as possible.
  - Navigate closer to the African coastline where feasible.
  - Maintain coordination with maritime security reporting centers, both MSCIO and UKMTO.
  - Conduct a voyage-specific risk assessment and adhere to BMP-MS.
  - Before transiting the area, take into consideration any direct or indirect affiliations between the vessel, its ownership, or its cargo and countries of interest.

- Reports indicate GNSS/GPS disruption in the central Red Sea. Vessels may experience degradation or loss of satellite navigation signals. Enhance radar and landmark procedures to support safe navigation, since GNSS are highly likely to be unreliable. Be prepared to rely on dead-reckoning navigation.

**1.1. TYPE OF INCIDENT:** PIRACY.

**1.2. PERIOD:** FM 24TH MAR 0700 UTC. ONGOING.

**1.3. LOCATION:** 400-500 NM SE Mogadishu, Somalia.

**2. VESSELS DETAILS.**

Fishing vessel - Iranian type dhow named "AL WASEEMI 786".

**3. RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT.**

A pirate action group (PAG), consisting of an unknown number of pirates, has allegedly hijacked an Iranian-flagged fishing vessel (dhow) named "AL WASEEMI 786", approximately 400NM East of Mogadishu.

Preliminary indicators suggest the incident as highly likely an opportunistic hijacking intended to repurpose the dhow as a mothership to facilitate subsequent piracy operations. The vessel is assessed to be proceeding southbound.

Vessels are strongly advised to maintain enhanced vigilance and avoid transiting the area indicated on Figure (Circle with centre 05.20S 049.24E and radius of 200nm).

EUNAVFOR ATALANTA will provide updates through MSCIO website as further information becomes available.

**More information available in the following links:**
**MSCIO:**
MSC IO | Alerts
MSC IO | IRTB Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin

# MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY
## (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)

| No | Date | Name | MSE Category | Last info. |
|----|------|------|--------------|-----------|
| 54 | 31 DEC | FV LIAO DONG YU 578 | Armed Robbery | Armed robbery reported off the coast of Banderbeyla (Bari Region). PSP has informed that the Vessel has been released near Ceel Dhidar, Bandarbeyla district. According to local credible sources, a ransom of 1.2 USD was paid. |
| 55 | 02 JAN | FV SULTANA 2 | Hijack | Alert on IORIS from PMPF. Dhow located off Al- Nushayah. All passengers disembarked. 13JAN Yemen Coast Guard confirmed. RESOLVED after agreement with the vessel's owner. Dhow and crew RELEASED |
| 56 | 03 FEB | FV AL-WALEED | Armed Robbery | Received a report from Yemen CG on 03 Feb, that a group of 4 armed men captured a Yemeni 8 meter boat (blue hull) on the coast of Hafun. One fisherman was on board during the capture but was later released. The boat is allegedly taken to Dudura coast. Boat size and engine are not coherent with piracy TTP. Event still pending further investigation. |
| 57 | 26 FEB | UNKNOWN | Piracy Attack | PMPF has reported that two skiffs attempted attacking an Iranian flagged vessel. The vessels defensive actions prevented the boarding. One attacker reportedly killed and two injured. Initial information from LNO MOG and Puntland police, the PAG composition is 9 pirates. PMPF has also allegedly arrested 3 pirates and taken in custody 1 of the 2 skiffs. |
| 58 | 24 MAR | AL WASEEMI 786 | Pirated | Received a report that Iranian dhow "AL WASEEMI 786" with 24 crew members was pirated on the 19 of March aprox 400nm from Mogadishu. The PAG group consisting of a number between 10 and 15 pirates. No injuries reported. |

🟢 Solved or closed cases  🔴 Active cases

## PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM NOV 2023 (58)

Legend:
- SUSPICIOUS APPROACH
- BOARDING
- HIJACK
- ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA
- ATTEMPTED BOARDING
- PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMEM ROBBERY ATTEMPT
- PIRATED



Monsoon timeline: NE Monsoon | SW Monsoon | NE Monsoon | SW Monsoon | NE Monsoon

## PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM 2008



**SUSPICIOUS APPROACH**
- Sudden changes of course towards the ship and aggressive behavior. CPA inside 1nm with clear intention to attack and/or weapons clearly displayed.

**ATTEMPTED BOARDING**
- An Act where the PAG failed to get onboard and gain control of the vessel or members of the crew. Boarding paraphernalia were employed or visible in the approach.

**BOARDING**
- A boarding in which the attackers have boarded the ship but have NOT taken control.

**PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMED ROBERY ATTEMPT**
- Ship has been subject to an aggressive approach by unidentified craft and weapons have been discharged. Also, paraphernalia/ tripwires related to piracy, hooks, ladders ect have been reported.

**HIJACK**
- Attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a vessel at the high seas against the crew's will.

**PIRATED**
- A pirated vessel is a vessel subject to an act that falls under the UNCLOS Article 101 definition of piracy.

**ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA**
- Any illegal act of violence or detention within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.

## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is ALMOST CERTAIN that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is HIGHLY LIKELY that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

It is ALMOST CERTAIN that the ransom paid for the LIAO DONG YU will set a bad example for other pirate groups trying to imitate that operation.

## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the GULF OF ADEN.

From Puntland to Jubaland coastal areal (Eastern Somali Coast) the piracy threat assessment (TA) is determined as **SUBSTANTIAL**.

| THREAT ASSESSMENT | BENIGN | LOW | MODERATE | SUBSTANTIAL | SEVERE | CRITICAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| YARDSTICK | An attack is **HIGHLY UNLIKELY** (10% – 20%) | An attack is **UNLIKELY** (>25% – 35%) | An attack is a **REALISTIC POSSIBILITY** (40% – <50%) | An attack is **LIKELY / PROBABLE** (55% – <75%) | An attack is **HIGHLY LIKELY** (80% – 90%) | An attack is **ALMOST CERTAIN** (>95%) |

# MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)
## VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE

### WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

### WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

### HOW TO REPORT

- Online: www.mscio.eu
- Email: postmaster@mscio.eu
- Copy UKMTO: watchkeepers@ukmto.com

### BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -

- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -

- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

**Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea**

**REGISTRATION AND REPORTING.**

CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (**https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/**)

- UKMTO (**https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report**)

And to report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

**Contact Information (MSCIO):**

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