





# MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

15th May – 21st May

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
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# OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)




CATEGORY		No.
	Armed Robbery	Nil
	Attack	Nil
	Attempted Boarding	Nil
	Boarding	Nil
	Hijack	Nil
	Kidnap	Nil
	Piracy	3
	Suspicious Activity	3
	Other Maritime Crimes	Nil
<b>Total Incidents</b>		<b>6</b>



# PIRACY

- **TYPE OF INCIDENT:** PIRACY.
- **LOCATION:** Horn of Africa, Somalia.
- **RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT:**

Several piracy-related incidents continue to be monitored off the coasts of Somalia and Yemen. On 26 April, the merchant vessel M/V SWARD (IMO 9174244) was confirmed hijacked and remains under the control of armed individuals, with its latest reported position at 07°13'N 049°33'E. Operation ATALANTA also continues monitoring the hijacking of tanker M/T HONOUR 25 (IMO 1099735), first reported on 21 April, with the latest reported position at 08°55'N 050°33'E. Additionally, on 2 May, armed individuals reportedly boarded and hijacked tanker EUREKA (IMO 1022823) while at anchorage off Qana Port, Yemen; Operation ATALANTA later confirmed the vessel's position at 09°50'N 050°54'E. Operation ATALANTA assets have also confirmed that the dhow hijacked on 25 April 2026 has been released and the crew is safe. All remaining incidents continue to be monitored by Operation ATALANTA assets in coordination with regional authorities, while vessels operating in the area are advised to maintain heightened vigilance, adhere to BMP-MS guidance, and report suspicious activity to MSCIO and UKMTO.




## SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY

- **TYPE OF INCIDENT:** SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY
- **LOCATION:** Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Hormuz and off the northern Somali coast.
- **RELEVANT INFORMATION RELATED WITH THE EVENT:**


During the reporting period, MSCIO published three alerts related to suspicious maritime activity in the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Hormuz and off the northern Somali coast. On 14 May 2026, a vessel anchored northeast of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, was reportedly taken by unauthorized personnel and later assessed to be proceeding toward Iranian Territorial Waters. On 15 May 2026, a suspicious high-speed boat reportedly stopped a fishing vessel near position 11°52'N 044°42'E, with individuals onboard observed carrying weapons resembling AK-47 rifles. Additionally, on 18 May 2026, Operation ATALANTA received information regarding a possible Pirate Action Group (PAG) threat involving a skiff operating near Bosaso, Somalia, at position 11°51'N 049°10'E, potentially intending to attempt the hijacking of a merchant vessel. All incidents were monitored and investigated by Operation ATALANTA and relevant maritime security authorities. At the time of reporting, none of these alerts remain active.

**At the time of reporting, none of these alerts remain active.**





# OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE AS/SoH/GoO





## ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR AS/SoH/GoO



- The maritime security environment in the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman remains CRITICAL. Navigation interference, blockade enforcement activity, residual kinetic threats and reported mine risks continue to create a highly unstable operating environment. Merchant traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains significantly reduced.
- Multiple reports continue to indicate aggressive hailing and assertive action by Iranian units, while blockade-related enforcement activity remains ongoing. Rapid short-notice actions near Iranian territorial waters and nearby anchorages remain possible. Vessels anchored close to the Strait of Hormuz may be instructed to relocate or face consequences. Ships stationary for prolonged periods or maintaining AIS transmissions may face increased targeting risk.
- GNSS interference, AIS anomalies and spoofing continue to affect the Strait of Hormuz approaches, Gulf of Oman and adjacent waters. Mariners should anticipate unreliable or unavailable GNSS data and be prepared to navigate using radar, visual observations, dead reckoning and terrestrial navigation methods.
- Extreme traffic congestion, AIS saturation, erratic manoeuvring and reduced CPA margins may significantly increase collision and grounding risks during any surge in vessel transits.
- During the reporting period, the document *“INDUSTRY GUIDANCE ON THE Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz”* was published. The guidance is intended to assist in the planning and safe management of vessel transits into, within, or out of the Gulf region during periods of heightened regional security risk, and should be read in conjunction with the latest version of BMP-MS.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
  - Conduct voyage-specific threat and risk assessments in coordination with UKMTO, MSCIO and relevant authorities.
  - Consider delaying transit should navigational safety or security conditions deteriorate.
  - Strictly adhere to BMP-MS and relevant Industry Guidance.
  - Maintain continuous monitoring of VHF Ch16 and official reporting channels.
  - Ensure bridge teams are prepared for GNSS degradation, spoofing and AIS anomalies.
  - Enhance bridge manning, radar monitoring and visual lookout procedures.
  - Maintain engines and steering systems at immediate readiness during transit.
  - Avoid unnecessary reductions in speed and minimise stationary periods where operationally feasible.
  - Use AIS in accordance with company policy, Flag State guidance and latest military advisories.
  - Report suspicious activity, electronic interference and security incidents immediately to MSCIO and UKMTO.



## ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR RED SEA/BeM



- The maritime threat level in the Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb and Gulf of Aden remains MODERATE. Commercial traffic continues steadily through the area and no confirmed Houthi maritime attacks have been reported during the reporting period. However, Houthi messaging and hostile rhetoric continue without associated operational indicators, and the potential for renewed disruption remains should regional tensions escalate.
- Merchant vessels should continue to consider possible exposure based on ownership, cargo, Flag State affiliations or perceived associations with countries of interest.
- GNSS interference remains a residual hazard across the central Red Sea, with periodic effects extending into the southern sector and Bab el Mandeb approaches. Mariners should verify positions using alternative navigation methods when required.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
  - Maintain navigation through international waters for as long as possible.
  - Navigate closer to the African coastline where feasible and operationally appropriate.
  - Maintain close coordination with MSCIO, UKMTO and relevant maritime security reporting centers.
  - Conduct voyage-specific risk assessments and strictly adhere to BMP-MS.
  - Monitor electronic interference and verify navigation data through radar and visual cross-checks.
  - Review vessel affiliations, cargo exposure and ownership considerations prior to transit.
  - Maintain enhanced vigilance and report suspicious activity immediately to MSCIO and UKMTO.



## MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)



No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
54	31 DEC	FV LIAO DONG YU 578	Armed Robbery	Armed robbery reported off the coast of Banderbeyla (Bari Region). PSP has informed that the Vessel has been released near Ceel Dhidar, Bandarbeyla district. According to local credible sources, 2 pirates were apprehended and a ransom of 1.2 USD was paid.
55	03 FEB	FV AL-WALEED	Armed Robbery	Received a report from Yemen CG on 03 Feb, that a group of 4 armed men captured a Yemeni 8 meter boat (blue hull) on the coast of Hafun. One fisherman was on board during the capture but was later released. The boat is allegedly taken to Dudura coast. Boat size and engine are not coherent with piracy TTP. Event still pending further investigation.
56	24 MAR	AL WASEEMI 786	Pirated	Received a report that Iranian dhow "AL WASEEMI 786" with 19 crew members was pirated on the 19 of March approx 400nm from Mogadishu. The PAG group consisting of a number between 10 and 15 pirates. No injuries reported. On 5 <sup>th</sup> APR 26 the pirates disembarked the dhow and went inland to an UNKNOWN location. EUNAVFOR ATALANTA conducted FA to ensure the crew safety and gather further information.

● Solved or closed cases.

● Active cases



## MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)



No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
57	19 APR	FV ALKHAYR 2	Hijacked	PMPF informed via IORIS on 21 April that FV "ALKHAYR 2" was hijacked IVO Xaafuun on 19 <sup>th</sup> April by 11 armed individuals (PAG). The FV was released on 21 Apr by the PAG.
58	21 APR (TBD)	MT HONOUR 25	Pirated	PMPF informed via IORIS on 21 April that FV "ALKHAYR 2" was hijacked IVO Xaafuun on 19 <sup>th</sup> April by 11 armed individuals (PAG). On 21 Apr OHQ was informed that MT HONOUR 25 was pirated by the PAG and now is anchored near GARMAAL, Puntland.
59	22 APR	MV ELFRIEDE	Piracy attack	A small white fishing boat rapidly approach the MV. At approximately 600 metres warning shots were fired and the persons on-board the approaching boat returned fire. The craft then broke off, joined another FV and moved away both of them. The master of MV reports all crew is safe.
60	25 APR	CV FAHAD 4	Armed Robbery at Sea	EUNAVFOR ATALANTA received info from PMPF stating that it was hijacked by a PAG of 11 individuals IVO DHINOWDA (10NM off coast). ALMOST CERTAIN it has been involved in the suspicious approach towards the MT MINERVA PISCES on 28 <sup>th</sup> APR. Released on 04 May 26 after ransom was paid.
61	26 APR	MV SWARD	Pirated	EUNAVFOR ATALANTA received a report from PMPF that MV SWARD was hijacked near GARACAD offshore area, outside TTW. Vessel owner informed PMPF.
62	28 APR	MV MINERVA PISCES	Suspicious Approach	A suspicious Dhow crossed the MV from starboard to port at a CPA approx 1.2NM. A skiff was then sighted ahead and later approached from the starboard bow o a distance of approx 400m. All crew are safe and accounted for. MV continued sailing towards the next port of call.

- Solved or closed cases.
- Active cases



## MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)


No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
63	01 MAY	MV NEW VENTURE	Suspicious Approach	MSCIO received a report of an incident involving a MV, while sailing towards the IRTC. A suspicious skiff carrying approximately 7 armed people approached the vessel, closing to a distance of 10 meters approx. and reportedly demonstrating clear intent to board. After MV increased the speed and carried out defensive measures, the skiff aborted their approach.
64	02 MAY	MV EUREKA	Pirated	MSCIO received a report of a possible hijacking involving MT EUREKA, while at anchorage off QANA Port, SHABWA, YEMEN. Armed individuals boarded the vessel and took control. The vessel is currently sailing in the Somalian coast.

● Solved or closed cases.  
● Active cases




# PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – MAY 2026)

## PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM NOV 2023 (64)



### PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM 2008



- SUSPICIOUS APPROACH**

  - Sudden changes of course towards the ship and aggressive behavior. CPA inside 1nm with clear intention to attack and/or weapons clearly displayed.
- ATTEMPTED BOARDING**

  - An Act where the PAG failed to get onboard and gain control of the vessel or members of the crew. Boarding paraphernalia were employed or visible in the approach.
- BOARDING**


  - A boarding in which the attackers have boarded the ship but have NOT taken control.
- PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMED ROBERY ATTEMPT**

  - Ship has been subject to an aggressive approach by unidentified craft and weapons have been discharged. Also, paraphernalia/ tripwires related to piracy, hooks, ladders ect have been reported.
- HIJACK**

  - Attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a vessel at the high seas against the crew's will.
- PIRATED**

  - A pirated vessel is a vessel subject to an act that falls under the UNCLOS Article 101 definition of piracy.
- ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA**

  - Any illegal act of violence or detention within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.



## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.


It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the ransom paid for the LIAO DONG YU has set a bad example for other pirate groups trying to imitate that operation.

In the previous 8 months (since October 2025) at least 3 PAGs were activated and performed attacks against FVs and MVs with limited success, only the Chinese FV was considered a success for the PAG, but with no consequences at all for the pirates from the law enforcement agencies. Also we are observing a change in some of the TTPs (like the type dhow and a possible coordination among the PAGs).

## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

(EU R) The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as:

- **MODERATE** from NE Puntland to Hirshabelle.
- **SUBSTANTIAL** from Northern coast of Puntland to Southern coast of Yemen.
- **LOW** in the remaining areas.



THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – <50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – <75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (>95%)



## REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

### REGISTRATION AND REPORTING.

CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>)
- UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>)

And to report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

### Contact Information (MSCIO):

Tel: 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 (0) 298 220 170

Website: [www.mscio.eu](http://www.mscio.eu)

Email: [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)

# MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)

VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE



## WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

## WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

## HOW TO REPORT

- Online: [www.mscio.eu](http://www.mscio.eu)
- Email: [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)
- Copy UKMTO: [watchkeepers@ukmto.com](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.com)

## BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -
- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -
- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea