



MSCIO ATALANTA WEEKLY REPORT

13th Mar – 19th Mar

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
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OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



CATEGORY		No.	Page Ref.
	Armed Robbery	Nil	NSTR
	Attack	1	Slide 3
	Attempted Boarding	Nil	NSTR
	Boarding	Nil	NSTR
	Hijack	Nil	NSTR
	Kidnap	Nil	NSTR
	Piracy	Nil	NSTR
	Suspicious Activity	2	Slide 3
	Other Maritime Crimes	Nil	NSTR
Total Incidents		3	



OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE AS/SoH/GoO



EVENTS FROM 13-19MAR			
NUMBER	DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION
23	19-Mar	RAS LAFFAN ANCHOR AGE	A vessel has been hit by an unknown projectile 4NM east of Ras Laffan. The impact was due to falling debris, resulting in minor damage to the vessel. The crew is reported to be safe.
22	18-Mar	2521N, 5631E	A vessel has reportedly been struck by an unknown projectile, causing a fire on board, approximately 10NM from Khor Fakkan (UAE). Investigations still ongoing.
21	16-Mar	25-03N 056-46E	A Tanker vessel has reportedly been struck by an unknown projectile approximately 23NM from the coast of United Arab Emirates. Further investigations indicate that the vessel was affected by falling debris in the vicinity. The crew is reported safe and the vessel sustained only minor damage.

More detailed information can be found in:
[MSCIO EU | Advisories](#)



ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR AS/SoH/GoO

- Military operations keep ongoing in the region and the maritime security environment in the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent waters remains significantly deteriorated.
- It has been noticed a decrease in the number of ships directly attacked. However, It is possible that vessels in the vicinity may be affected by falling debris from missile or drone interceptions. Masters are advised to follow the post-incident procedures outlined in [BMP-MS](#).
- Due to current high threat level, **TRANSIT THROUGH THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ STILL REMAINS NOT RECOMMENDED.**
- Heavy GNSS/AIS spoofing inside the Arabian Gulf, SoH and Gulf of Oman is still reported. Additionally, intermittent disruptions affecting communications and radar systems have also been observed.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
 - ✓ Avoid transiting the Strait of Hormuz until the security situation improves.
 - ✓ Adhere to guidance issued by their Flag State or competent national authorities when considering transit.
 - ✓ Perform enhanced risk assessment.
 - ✓ Strictly adhere to BMP-MS.
 - ✓ Monitor Ch16 VHF and be prepared to be hailed.
 - ✓ Use AIS as per company policy.
 - ✓ Whenever possible, increase distance from any naval forces to mitigate risk.
 - ✓ Enhance radar and landmark procedures to support safe navigation, since GNSS are highly likely to be unreliable.
 - ✓ Be prepared to rely on dead-reckoning navigation.



ASSESSMENT AND GUIDANCE FOR RED SEA/BeM

- The potential for the resumption of hostile activity by Iranian-aligned Houthi forces against commercial shipping in the Red Sea and adjacent approaches remains active but it is not considered probable.
- Currently, no Houthi attacks have been reported in the maritime domain.
- Merchant vessels should expect:
 - Higher exposure for vessels with certain affiliations.
 - Potential delays for vessels requesting close protection.
- It is advised for merchant vessels to:
 - Maintain navigation through international waters for as long as possible.
 - Navigate closer to the African coastline where feasible.
 - Maintain coordination with maritime security reporting centers, both MSCIO and UKMTO.
 - Conduct a voyage-specific risk assessment and adhere to BMP-MS.
 - Before transiting the area, take into consideration any direct or indirect affiliations between the vessel, its ownership, or its cargo and countries of interest.
- Reports indicate GNSS/GPS disruption in the central Red Sea. Vessels may experience degradation or loss of satellite navigation signals. Enhance radar and landmark procedures to support safe navigation, since GNSS are highly likely to be unreliable. Be prepared to rely on dead-reckoning navigation.



MARITIME SECURITY EVENTS RELATED TO PIRACY (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION FROM JAN 2026)





No	Date	Name	MSE Category	Last info.
54	31 DEC	FV LIAO DONG YU 578	Armed Robbery	Armed robbery reported off the coast of Banderbeyla (Bari Region). PSP has informed that the Vessel has been released near Ceel Dhidar, Bandarbeyla district. According to local credible sources, a ransom of 1.2 USD was paid.
55	02 JAN	FV SULTANA 2	Hijack	Alert on IORIS from PMPF. Dhow located off Al- Nushayah. All passengers disembarked. 13JAN Yemen Coast Guard confirmed. RESOLVED after agreement with the vessel's owner. Dhow and crew RELEASED
56	03 FEB	FV AL-WALEED	Armed Robbery	Received a report from Yemen CG on 03 Feb, that a group of 4 armed men captured a Yemeni 8 meter boat (blue hull) on the coast of Hafun. One fisherman was on board during the capture but was later released. The boat is allegedly taken to Dudura coast. Boat size and engine are not coherent with piracy TTP. The event is considered closed as no longer poses a threat to SLOCs.
57	26 FEB	UNKNOWN	Piracy Attack	PMPF has reported that two skiffs attempted attacking an Iranian flagged vessel. The vessels defensive actions prevented the boarding. One attacker reportedly killed and two injured. Initial information from LNO MOG and Puntland police, the PAG composition is 9 pirates. PMPF has also allegedly arrested 3 pirates and taken in custody 1 of the 2 skiffs.

● Solved or closed cases ● Active cases




PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – MAR 2026)

PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM NOV 2023 (57)



- SUSPICIOUS APPROACH**
 - Sudden changes of course towards the ship and aggressive behavior. CPA inside 1nm with clear intention to attack and/or weapons clearly displayed.
- ATTEMPTED BOARDING**
 - An Act where the PAG failed to get onboard and gain control of the vessel or members of the crew. Boarding paraphernalia were employed or visible in the approach.
- BOARDING**
 - A boarding in which the attackers have boarded the ship but have NOT taken control.
- PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMED ROBBERY ATTEMPT**
 - Ship has been subject to an aggressive approach by unidentified craft and weapons have been discharged. Also, paraphernalia/ tripwires related to piracy, hooks, ladders ect have been reported.
- HIJACK**
 - Attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a vessel at the high seas against the crew's will.
- PIRATED**
 - A pirated vessel is a vessel subject to an act that falls under the UNCLOS Article 101 definition of piracy.
- ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA**
 - Any illegal act of violence or detention within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.



PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the ransom paid for the LIAO DONG YU will set a bad example for other pirate groups trying to imitate that operation.




ATALANTA PIRACY THREAT UPDATE

PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the **GULF OF ADEN**.

Coast of Bari (NE of Somalia) and East coast from Bari to Galgadud region remain MODERATE.



THREAT ASSESSMENT	BENIGN	LOW	MODERATE	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	CRITICAL
YARDSTICK	An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%)	An attack is UNLIKELY (>25% – 35%)	An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – <50%)	An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – <75%)	An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%)	An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (>95%)

MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)

VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE



WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

HOW TO REPORT

- Online: www.mscio.eu
- Email: postmaster@mscio.eu
- Copy UKMTO: watchkeepers@ukmto.com

BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -
- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -
- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea



REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

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CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (<https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/>)
- UKMTO (<https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report>)

And to report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

Contact Information (MSCIO):

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