# MSCIO ATALANTA
# WEEKLY REPORT

## 06th Feb – 12th Feb

✉ **postmaster@mscio.eu**  📞 **0033 (0) 298 220 220**

🖥 **https://mscio.eu/**  📞 **0033 (0) 298 220 170**

# OVERVIEW OF INCIDENTS IN THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING AREA (VRA)



| CATEGORY | No. | Page Ref. |
|---|---|---|
| ⬤ Armed Robbery | Nil | NSTR |
| ⬤ Attack | Nil | NSTR |
| ⬤ Attempted Boarding | Nil | NSTR |
| ⬤ Boarding | Nil | NSTR |
| ⬤ Hijack | Nil | NSTR |
| ⬤ Kidnap | Nil | NSTR |
| ⬤ Piracy | Nil | NSTR |
| ⬤ Suspicious Activity | Nil | NSTR |
| ⬤ Other Maritime Crimes | Nil | NSTR |
| **Total Incidents** | | 0 |

# MARITIME SECURITY CENTRE INDIAN OCEAN (MSCIO)

**VOLUNTARY REPORTING THAT MAKES A DIFFERENCE**

## WHY TO REPORT

- Improve Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)
- Enable rapid information-sharing and coordination.
- Support vessels in High Risk Areas.
- Contribute to collective maritime security efforts.

## WHAT TO REPORT

- Entry into the Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA).
- Daily position updates.
- Exit from the VRA or arrival at a safe port.
- Suspicious activity or incidents.
- Attacks, attempted or successful.

## HOW TO REPORT

- Online: www.mscio.eu
- Email: postmaster@mscio.eu
- Copy UKMTO: watchkeepers@ukmto.com

## BENEFITS OF REPORTING

- IMPROVED MONITORING AND PROTECTION DURING TRANSIT -

- ACCESS TO TIMELY THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND SECURITY ALERTS -

- ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH NAVAL FORCES OPERATING IN THE REGION -

**Your report strengthens maritime security across the Indian Ocean and Red Sea**

**To know more about different maritime security threats, please access to the following links:**

[MSC IO | Useful Links](#)

**1.  General Maritime Security:**

[MSC IO | General Maritime Security](#)

**2. Maritime Terrorism:**

[MSC IO | Maritime Terrorism](#)

**3. Piracy Information:**

[MSC IO | Piracy Information](#)

**4. Illegal Traffic and Fishing**

[MSC IO | Illegal Traffic & Fishing](#)

**5.  Maritime Cybersecurity Information.**

[MSC IO | Maritime Cybersecurity Information](#)

**6. Submarine Critical Infrastructure.**

[MSC IO | Submarine Critical Infraestructure](#)

# MARITIME SECURITY RELATED EVENTS (STATUS AND DETAILED DESCRIPTION)

| NO | DATE | NAME | MSE CATEGORY | LAST INFO. |
|----|------|------|--------------|------------|
| 53 | 31 DEC | FV LIAO DONG YU 578 | Armed Robbery | Hijack reported off the coast of Banderbeyla (Bari Region). FV at anchor.<br><br>**NO CHANGES** |
| 54 | 02 JAN | FV SULTANA 2 | Hijack | Alert on IORIS from PMPF. Dhow located off Al- Nushayah. All passengers disembarked. 13JAN Yemen Coast Guard confirmed. RESOLVED after agreement with the vessel's owner. Dhow and crew RELEASED. |
| 55 | 03 FEB | FV AL-WALEED | Hijack | Alert from Yemen Coast Guard. Group of 4 armed hijackers. Blue hull, 8 meter Yemeni boat, coast of Hafun. Reports one fishermen onboard and released. Allegedly boat is taken to Durdura coast.<br><br>**NO UPDATES** |

🟢 *Solved or closed cases*　　🔴 *Active cases*　　🟡 *Unsolved cases*

# PIRACY STATISTICS (NOV 2023 – FEB 2026)



## PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM NOV23 (56)

Legend:
- ■ SUSPICIOUS APPROACH
- ■ BOARDING
- ■ HIJACK
- ■ ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA
- ■ ATTEMPTED BOARDING
- ■ PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMEM ROBBERY ATTEMPT
- ■ PIRATED

Monsoon timeline: NE Monsoon — SW Monsoon — NE Monsoon — SW Monsoon — NE Monsoon

## PIRACY RELATED EVENTS FROM 2008

**MSE Categories iaw ATALANTA-CMF + INDUSTRY agreement**

**SUSPICIOUS APPROACH**
- Sudden changes of course towards the ship and aggressive behavior. CPA inside 1nm with clear intention to attack and/or weapons clearly displayed.

**ATTEMPTED BOARDING**
- An Act where the PAG failed to get onboard and gain control of the vessel or members of the crew. Boarding paraphernalia were employed or visible in the approach.

**BOARDING**
- A boarding in which the attackers have boarded the ship but have NOT taken control.

**PIRACY ATTACK/ ARMED ROBERY ATTEMPT**
- Ship has been subject to an aggressive approach by unidentified craft and weapons have been discharged. Also, paraphernalia/ tripwires related to piracy, hooks, ladders ect have been reported.

**HIJACK**
- Attackers have illegally boarded and taken control of a vessel against the crew's will.

**PIRATED**
- A pirated vessel is a vessel subject to an act that falls under the UNCLOS Article 101 definition of piracy.

**ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA**
- Any illegal act of violence or detention within a state's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial seas.

# PIRACY SITUATION (NOV 2023 – FEB 2026)



## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

It is **ALMOST CERTAIN** that the PAG's tactics for conducting piracy on the high seas involve hijacking a dhow and using it as a mother ship. The pirates then blend in with the usual traffic and deploy skiffs from the mother ship to attack vessels. They are able to navigate to the high seas, with evidence of events up to up to 600 nautical miles off the East Somali coast.

Nevertheless, from November 2024 it is becoming increasingly common for a group of people to organise themselves, identify a vulnerable ship close to the coast and use skiffs to carry out an attack. These attacks typically target Yemeni fishing dhows. While there is no confirmed information, it is **HIGHLY LIKELY** that ransoms would have been paid.

On the other hand, that risk could be amplified if local fishermen turn into pirates as a consequence that no effective action is being taken from the authorities to safeguard Somali TTW from IUUF.

On October 2025 a PAG was formed that used the original PAG's tactics. As the PAG was not apprehended by the authorities until now, it should be considered inland in Garacaad area but active. It is possible that the PAG that hijacked the Chinese FV on Dec 31 could be the same one.

## PIRACY ASSESSMENT

The PIRACY Threat Assessment (TA) is determined as **LOW** in the **GULF OF ADEN**.

**Coast of Bari** (NE of Somalia) and **East coast from Bari to Galgadud** region remain **MODERATE**.



| THREAT ASSESSMENT | BENIGN | LOW | MODERATE | SUBSTANTIAL | SEVERE | CRITICAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| YARDSTICK | An attack is HIGHLY UNLIKELY (10% – 20%) | An attack is UNLIKELY (>25% – 35%) | An attack is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY (40% – <50%) | An attack is LIKELY / PROBABLE (55% – <75%) | An attack is HIGHLY LIKELY (80% – 90%) | An attack is ALMOST CERTAIN (>95%) |

# REGISTRATION AND REPORTING

**Registration and reporting**.

CSO's and Masters are encouraged to register their vessels upon entering the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area with both:

- MSCIO (**https://mscio.eu/reporting/vessel-registration/**)

- UKMTO (**https://www.ukmto.org/reporting-formats/initial-report**)

And report all incidents to UKMTO and MSCIO.

When safe to do so, vessels should document incidents and suspicious activity through logs, photographs, video, and radar footage. CSOs should gather information on Pattern of Life and Maritime Situational Awareness for their planned routes and ports of call to support risk assessments. These procedures enable effective monitoring and resource allocation by CMF and EUNAVFOR ATALANTA.

**Contact Information (MSCIO):**

**Tel: 0033 (0) 298 220 220 // 0033 (0) 298 220 170**

**Website: www.mscio.eu**

**Email: postmaster@mscio.eu**