INCIDENT REPORT
Ref. UKMTO Warning Incident 026-25

On July 6th, 2025, the security provider supporting M/V MAGIC SEAS (IMO 9736169) reported that the vessel had been attacked by up to 8 small craft to include multiple USVs, small arms fire, and RPGs. The vessel reported being struck by two USVs and one missile. Due to the damage, fires, and flooding, the crew abandoned ship and was recovered by M/V SAFEEN PRISM (IMO 9603611). Recovery efforts are underway for the vessel.

1)1125UTC: The CSO of MAGIC SEAS reports to UKMTO that the vessel is under attack by 4-5, small craft in posn 14 28N 042 03E. There is an exchange of small arms fire between the onboard AST and the attackers, who also fired an RPG, damaging the bridge. All crew except Master and AST mustered in the citadel.

2)1248UTC: Under attack by 7-8 small craft.

3)1401UTC: CSO confirms that MAGIC SEAS has been struck by 1 missile in the cargo hold. Additionally, 4 USVs were involved in the attack, 2 neutralised by AST, 2 impacted the vessel. CSO confirms no casualties, extent of damage unknown.

4)1449UTC: The CSO reports that the crew are preparing to abandon MAGIC SEAS due to an active fire in the cargo hold and flooding in the engine room.

5) 4)1541UTC: The CSO confirms the crew of MAGIC SEAS are abandoning ship in posn 1457N 04139E and recovered by M/V SAFEEN PRISM.

Fig.1

M/V MAGIC SEAS

The Liberian-flagged vessel was on transit from China, carrying fertilizer and steel billets to Turkey. The vessel was transmitting AIS at the time of the attack.

JMIC research revealed a prior visit to Israel for MV MAGIC SEAS along with recent visits by ships of the same beneficial owner.

JMIC GUIDANCE

1. Freedom of navigation and the free flow of maritime commerce continue as a top priority while the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. The current threat assessment identifies:

> **a**. Vessels with an Israeli, United States or United Kingdom association at highest risk
> **b**. Any vessel within a Group or Company fleet structure whereby the company has been identified making port calls to Israel

2. Vessels intending to transit the threat area are recommended to exercise caution by applying the following:

    a. Conduct a threat and risk assessment prior to entering the area

    b. Review security measures/incorporate appropriate vessel hardening measures into their security plans

    c. Turning off any form of non-essential emissions (e.g. intraship UHF/VHF transmissions) and AIS policy in the vicinity of, or before transiting or entering the threat area is to be very carefully considered as part of the voyage risk mitigation process, as broadcasting on AIS is assessed to aid Houthi targeting

        i. While transmitting AIS may be consistent with SOLAS, it may compromise the safety & security of the vessel and crew

        ii. If AIS is turned off, consider altering course and speed to minimize tracking by Dead Reckoning

    d. Do not loiter when transiting the threat area and proceed with caution

    e. If contacted by any unrecognized organization:

        i. Report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding

    f. If contacted on VHF by "Yemeni Navy":

        i. Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so

        ii. Describe the incident in follow up reports to UKMTO

    g. Share instances of suspicious activity with UKMTO (with recordings or imagery where possible)

        i. UAV sightings

        ii. Communications challenges

    h. In case of unexploded ordnance and debris on deck:

        i. Maintain a safe distance (as far away as practically possible) and cordon off the area

        ii. Do not touch or try to dismantle any debris

        iii. Be aware that any radio emissions may trigger the device

        iv. Request assistance through UKMTO, ask for an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team (EOD)

    i. Use of Best Management Practices (BMP) should be considered

        i. Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG

Maritime Industry is recommended to:

    a. Conduct a threat & risk assessment of all associated vessels and especially those that may have previous USA, UK or Israel ownership or associations [to include recent port calls by vessels within the company and/or group structure]

    b. Companies should plan and implement risk mitigation measures in advance of the furthest identified attack areas as depicted in the JMIC 'Overview of Incidents and Suspicious Activities' slide

c. If an association is made, shipping companies are recommended to provide the information to UKMTO prior to transiting the threat area

d. Ensure their managed vessels receive and follow the guidance for vessels

e. Review digital footprint

f. The JMIC is aware of increased email communication between unrecognized reporting entities and owners/operators

      i. If contacted by any organization not officially recognized, report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding

      ii. Any response should be carefully considered

      iii. Statements by Houthi forces to encourage merchant shipping to engage with the Houthi's Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC), or Yemeni Navy, should be disregarded and industry best practice and guidance should be followed in close communication with your company's CSO

g. Open-source claims that vessels are targeted may not be factual

      i. JMIC recommends verifying source for legitimacy