Global's BMP - Section 6
Ship Master’s Planning
Ship Master’s planning prior to entering areas of increased risk
This section details the procedures that should be undertaken by the ship’s Master prior to a ship entering an area of increased risk identified through the risk assessment, in order to mitigate against the risk of attack.
Implement SPMs
SPMs should be implemented as determined through the risk assessment.
Brief crew, check equipment and conduct drills
Crew should be briefed on the necessary security arrangements identified in the SSP. Drills should be conducted prior to arrival in an area of increased risk as identified through the risk assessment. Drills should be unannounced, to ensure crew respond appropriately in the event of an actual attack. If necessary, drills should be repeated in order to improve response times. Personnel should be briefed on their duties, including ensuring familiarity with the alarm signal indicating an attack, an all-clear signal and the appropriate response to each. Consideration should also be given to the following:
- Testing the SPMs and physical security including all access points.
- Removing unnecessary equipment from the upper deck.
- Securing the accommodation block.
- Testing Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) (giving prior warning).
- Testing all communications equipment, alarms, etc.
- Testing all deck lights and search lights.
Ensure that crew members will not be trapped inside a ship, during an attack or during an emergency for example fire or flooding.
The location of any Safe Muster Point and/or Citadel should be known to all crew members. This location should only be shared with relevant third parties such as military or law enforcement authorities responding to an incident. The location should not be shared freely with any third party e.g. port authorities, stevedores, etc.
Emergency Communication Plan
Masters are advised to ensure that an Emergency Communication Plan has been developed in accordance with the risk assessment, that includes all essential emergency contact numbers and prepared messages, and which should be ready or permanently displayed near all external communications stations (e.g. telephone numbers of regional centres, CSO, IMB PRC etc.).
Automatic Identification System
It is recommended, subject to frequent assessment, that Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmission is left on throughout any and all areas of risk, but that it is configured to transmit ship’s identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safetyrelated information only. It should be recognised that certain flag and/or coastal State regulations can require AIS to be left on.
Define the ship’s Ship-to-ship Transfer (STS)/Single Buoy Mooring (SBM) policy
The following should be considered when planning Ship-to-ship Transfer (STS)/Single Buoy Mooring (SBM):
- During an STS operation it is essential that the lookout is coordinated between the tankers and any standby ships. This is particularly important as there may be restrictions on operating radar during an STS operation. 16Consideration should be given to the issuing of hand held night vision optics to assist with the identification and early warning of unidentified small craft.
- When conducting STS operations it is recommended that the Master establishes communications with the shore authority regardless of where the STS is taking place, but that contractor/agent communication should be as late as possible in the proceedings. All communications should be kept to a minimum to prevent unauthorised receipt of information.
- Consider the use of protected anchorages where available recognising that standards of protection vary widely.
- Consideration should be given to radar watches, Lighting arrangements and the notice for getting underway.
Use of codewords may be considered appropriate if it is believed that communications are likely to be compromised.
Ship Master’s planning on entering an area of increased risk
This section details the procedures that should be undertaken by the Master on the ship’s entry into an area of increased risk as identified through the risk assessment and during transit in order to mitigate against the risk of attack. When transiting areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment, further briefing and checks are likely to be required prior to entering them.
Submit initial Ship Position Report Form
If the voyage includes the transit of a VRA the Master should submit a “Ship Movement Registration” form to the relevant reporting centre (see the annexes as appropriate).
Implement the measures required by the risk assessment
The Master should ensure that the measures identified in the risk assessment have been effectively implemented.
Implement the Communications Policy
Master and Crew should ensure critical information does not fall into the wrong hands e.g. to protect the release of sailing times and routeing information (see section 5.1.7).
Consideration should be given to minimising the use of VHF. Use email or a secure satellite telephone instead. Where possible only answer known or legitimate callers on the VHF radio, bearing in mind that imposters are possible.
Maintenance and engineering work should be undertaken within any restrictions imposed by the voyage risk assessment
When operating in areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment – the following should be considered:
- Any work outside of the accommodation is strictly controlled and similarly access points limited and controlled;
- All Engine Room essential equipment to be immediately available;
- No maintenance on essential equipment.
Carefully review all warnings and information
The Master (and company) should appreciate that the voyage routeing may need to be reviewed in light of updated information received. This information and warnings may be provided by a number of different means, including navigational warnings – Sat C (and NAVTEXT in limited areas) as well as direct messaging in certain areas. It is important all warnings and information are carefully reviewed.
Consider speed and manoeuvring
Increasing speed makes it difficult for an attacker to board. Engines should be ready for immediate manoeuvre. The passage speed of the ship will be determined by the risk assessment. Consider planning on increasing ship speed, particularly if there is a low freeboard. Ships should spend as little time as possible stationary, drifting or operating at low speeds – especially when working inshore. If stationary, the use of protected anchorages should be considered, where available, recognising that standards of protection vary widely.
- The ability to get underway and/or increase to a maximum safe speed as quickly as possible when operating in areas of increased risk identified through the risk assessment is required is of the utmost importance. This will open the distance from any possible attack and make the ship more difficult to board.
- Manoeuvring away from a threat if detected at range increases the time taken for the attacking vessel to close its distance from the ship. Similarly making best use of sea conditions to create the most difficult transit conditions for small craft is another option. Aggressive manoeuvring when a small boat is close to or alongside makes the use of ladders and climbing ropes more difficult for the pirates.
Freeboard
- A ship underway is most easily boarded at the lowest point of its freeboard. Additional SPMs should be used to deny pirates access at these points.
- A ship’s freeboard height may change during a voyage. When changes in freeboard occur the effectiveness of SPMs will need to be considered during the risk assessment.
Location and Time at Anchor
- Keep time at anchor to a minimum where possible.
- Consider appropriate use of lighting (see section 7.10).
- Consider use of “safe anchorages” where they are provided. Information on safe anchorages is provided in local Notice to Mariners or Admiralty Charts (see annexes).
- The location of the anchorage, STS operation and SBM are also important factors in mitigating risks against attacks on the ship. Ships are most vulnerable when stopped in the water, drifting, at anchor, carrying out Ship to Ship (STS) transfer, ship’s ballast management operations or, slowing down for pilot transfer.
Coordinated Arrival
- Passage plans should be designed to result in arrival at a pilot station ‘just in time’ to avoid drifting or waiting in a vulnerable area. Many ships wait offshore and transit to meet the pilot at high speed. A period of high vulnerability is when the ship slows down to embark the pilot. Tendering early notice of readiness can be beneficial to prevent unnecessary loitering or drifting.
- Do not drift. Avoid being underway without making way.
Sea State
Attackers are known to conduct attacks from small fast craft, sometimes from motherships, which are easier to operate in more benign conditions. The calmer the sea state, the greater the risk of attack.
Increase vigilance during STS/SBM operations
The STS/SBM policy should be fully implemented (see section 6.1.5).
Submit daily position report to relevant reporting centre
When operating inside a VRA, ships are strongly encouraged to report daily relevant reporting centre by email/fax.
Consider utilisation of Convoy systems where available
In certain areas of risk military forces may offer assistance in the form of group transits and national convoys.